An email that appears to come from your company’s domain is still, for most customers and suppliers, evidence that it really is you. Without SPF, DKIM and DMARC that assumption is technically weak: someone else can produce a message that uses your domain in the From line. This article explains what the three records do, common set-up mistakes, and the sender rules published by Google and Yahoo, all from official sources. It is not a guarantee of security, and it is not a promise that “once you set this up, no spoofed mail will ever get through”.
What do the three records do?
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is how a domain announces, in DNS, which mail servers may send on its behalf. The receiving server looks at the envelope domain and checks whether the sending IP is authorised. The mechanism is defined in RFC 7208.
DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) lets the sender sign chosen parts of the message with a private key. The receiver verifies the signature with the public key in DNS, so it can see whether the content was altered in transit and whether the signing domain is under your control. The specification is RFC 6376.
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance) ties the domain in the From line to whether it “aligns” with SPF or DKIM, and attaches a policy. The policy may be p=none, p=quarantine or p=reject. Reporting addresses can also be defined. The specification is RFC 7489.
The three work together. SPF alone is fragile in forwarding scenarios. DKIM alone will not pass DMARC if the From domain and the signing domain differ. SPF and DKIM without DMARC leave the receiver without an answer to “what does this domain want done about spoofing?”
Why now, especially for SMEs?
Fake invoices, fake shipping notices and “please pay this, from accounts” messages do not need to exploit a software flaw; they borrow a trusted name. Email is also, under KVKK, both personal data and a communication channel. If someone else can use your domain, they can defraud your customers and damage your reputation.
Large receivers now also ask for a minimum of authentication. Google’s Gmail sender guidelines have, since 1 February 2024, expected every sender to Gmail accounts to have at least SPF or DKIM, valid forward and reverse DNS (PTR), TLS, and a complaint rate below 0.3%. For senders of 5,000 or more messages a day the bar is higher: SPF and DKIM together, a DMARC record of at least p=none, alignment of the From domain with SPF or DKIM, and one-click unsubscribe on marketing and subscribed mail.
Yahoo’s sender requirements set out a similar frame in the same period: for all senders, at least SPF or DKIM, a complaint rate below 0.3%, and valid DNS; for bulk senders, SPF and DKIM, a valid DMARC policy of at least p=none, alignment, and easy unsubscribe. Yahoo notes that DMARC reporting (rua) is particularly useful for monitoring.
A small firm should not skip these records on the grounds that “we never send 5,000 messages a day”. The rules are stricter for bulk senders, but an unauthenticated domain is open both to spoofing and to delivery problems. Google notes that unauthenticated messages may be marked as spam or rejected with a 5.7.26 error.
Common mistakes in set-up
There must be a single SPF record. Adding a second v=spf1 record breaks the structure the RFC expects. If you start using a new sending service (a campaign tool, for example), add its authorised servers to the existing record with include; do not open a second SPF record. SPF also has a DNS lookup limit; too many include mechanisms can exceed it.
Publishing a DKIM key in DNS but never signing in the application, or turning signing on at a provider and never adding the selector to the domain, produces a “looks present, does not work” state. Key length and the selector name should follow your provider’s documentation.
Setting DMARC immediately to p=reject can also cut off your own legitimate mail. If you have more than one sending service, it is safer to start with p=none and reports, watch the real sources, then move to quarantine and, if appropriate, reject. p=none alone does not stop spoofing; it meets the minimum bulk-sender bar at Google and Yahoo, but the policy itself does not yet reject.
If the From domain does not align with the SPF or DKIM domain, DMARC fails. If the visible sender and the technical sender differ, that should be a conscious design. Forwarded mail can break SPF; that does not always mean your record is wrong.
Finally, writing the records once and forgetting them is common. If the sending service changes and SPF is not updated, your legitimate mail may also look unauthorised.
In a small firm this is often treated as “set a record and leave it”. In fact your accounting package, support desk and, if you have one, campaign tool are separate senders; each must appear as authorised in DNS. Sending from an authenticated subdomain can isolate the main domain to some extent, but that subdomain still needs SPF, DKIM and, preferably, DMARC. Otherwise you close one door and leave another open.
How do you verify it?
Look at the records on your own name servers. Then send a test message to a Gmail or Yahoo address you control and inspect the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results in the message source. Google Postmaster Tools is an official way to watch complaint rates.
The free external attack-surface mini check includes a passive, external look at your SPF, DKIM and DMARC records. It is not a penetration test, does not require written offensive authorisation, and is not a guarantee of completeness. For a broader external review or a change to your mail set-up, write to us.
Tightening the policy, and the limits
p=reject makes spoofing harder; it can also hit forwarded mail and misconfigured legitimate senders. The decision should rest on your reports and on a real inventory of who sends for you. DMARC protects your domain; it does not, on its own, stop staff clicking a spoofed message from someone else’s domain. Awareness is a separate control.
Under KVKK these records can be thought of as one of the technical measures in Article 12: hardening a channel through which personal data travel. Email authentication is still not a compliance certificate.
You can use the free check to see how the domain looks from the outside, or write through the contact form to review the records together. This article does not guarantee the result of a DNS change; check your provider’s documentation and a test message before you treat the change as complete.
Sources
- RFC 7208, Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
- RFC 6376, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
- RFC 7489, Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
- Google, Email sender guidelines (Gmail Help)
- Yahoo Sender Hub, Email sender requirements
- Law No. 6698 on the Protection of Personal Data, Article 12
